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USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File

13 July 1951

D/I, USAF PROPOSED REVISIONS TO

NIE-36: BURMA: PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVAL OF
THE PRESENT REGIME
(Draft dated 10 July 1951)

1. Reference Page 1, Title. Revise to read:

SUBJECT: NIE-36: BURMA: PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVAL OF THE
PRESENT REGIME FOR THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS

2. Reference Page 1, Par. 1. Revise second sentence of this paragraph to read as follows:

It can keep the insurgents under control only so long as
they do not coordinate their operations and to not receive
substantial outside assistance.

3. Reference Page 1, Par. 2. Revise to read:

2. The Burmese Communists are the most dangerous of the insurgent groups and almost certainly will receive increased aid from the Chinese Communists during the next twelve months, although on a limited scale as long as present Chinese Communist commitments elsewhere continue.

4. Reference Page 1, Par. 3, Second Sentence. Revise second sentence to read:

Such a development would increase prospects for an anti-government coalition of insurgent groups and for a successful coup d'etat.

Review of this document by CIA
determined that

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- ☒ No further action
☐ If further action
is required, it is
recommended that

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☐ If contains material of
Date 12 May 81 Review 009256

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5. Reference Page 2, Par. 4. Revise to read:

4. The Chinese Communists have the capability to invade Burma, but present troop dispositions do not indicate such an intention. ~~probably will not do so openly, at least during the next twelve months.~~ Moreover, the Communists can substantially further their objectives in Burma by less direct action. Introduction of Chinese Communist "volunteer" forces in considerable numbers, ~~however,~~ is a continuing possibility and would greatly accelerate Communist control of northern Burma.

6. Reference Page 2, Par. 6, First Sentence. Revise first sentence to read:

6. There is little prospect that the regime can survive indefinitely without greatly augmented outside aid.

7. Reference Page 3, Par. 8, Third Sentence. Revise third sentence of this paragraph to read as follows:

Political weakness has been compounded by the financial and military strains of combatting internal insurrections and by the fact that rice exports, Burma's principal source of economic strength, ~~are at~~ have been reduced by internal unrest to less than half of pre-war levels.

8. Reference Page 4, Par. 9, First Sentence. Revise first sentence of this paragraph to read:

9. The Burmese armed forces are small, inadequately trained, and poorly equipped, but loyal to ~~the regime~~ their present military leaders.

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9. Reference Page 5, Par. 11, Beginning with Second Sentence. Revise to read:

In the past these groups have frequently dissipated their strength by fighting each other. ~~instead of the government, and this fact has greatly aided the latter.~~ The Burmese Government can probably continue to keep these insurgent groups under control so long as they do not coordinate their operations against the government and do not receive substantial outside aid.

10. Reference Page 6, Par. 12, Third and Fourth Sentences. Revise the third and fourth sentences of this paragraph to read:

In addition, there are fairly reliable reports that a band of 1,500 Kachins from northern Burma is being organized and trained by the Chinese Communists across the border in Yunnan, and presumably these would cooperate with the Burma Communists. However, ~~despite able and aggressive leadership,~~ the Burma Communist Party has not yet achieved a degree of control over these groups which would permit coordinated military operations against the government.

11. Reference Page 7, Par. 13, Last Sentence in Paragraph. Revise the last sentence of this paragraph to read:

They almost certainly will increase their material aid during the next year, although that aid necessarily will be ⁱⁿ limited quantities ~~because of~~ as long as present Chinese Communist commitments elsewhere continue.

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12. Reference Page 8, Par. 15, First and Second Sentences. Revise the first and second sentences of this paragraph to read:

15. Beyond the immediate threat posed by the ~~almost-certain~~ prospect of an increase in Chinese Communist material and technical aid to the Burmese Communist guerrillas, the Burmese Government is otherwise threatened in both the long and short run by the Chinese Communist regime. ~~Both the Chinese Communists and the USSR undoubtedly consider that~~ Communist control of Burma would be a great strategic advantage to both the Chinese Communists and the USSR.

13. Reference Page 9, Par. 16. Revise to read:

16. ~~For these reasons the~~ The Communists are already making substantial use of the Soviet and Chinese Communist diplomatic missions in Burma as bases for propaganda and subversive activities aimed at undermining the government. The Chinese community in Burma, ~~provides a further opportunity for spreading Chinese Communist influence through economic pressure,~~ is vulnerable to blackmail, and other forms of intimidation, and thus provides the Chinese Communists with a further opportunity for spreading their influence in Burma. ~~Each of these activities will undoubtedly be continued and intensified.~~

14. Reference Page 10, Par. 18, First Sentence. Revise first sentence of this paragraph to read:

18. The Communists have no immediate prospect of gaining complete control of Burma except through the intervention of large Chinese Communist forces.

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15. Reference Page 10, Par, 19, Second sentence. Revise second sentence of this paragraph to read:

These forces could be deployed across the Burma border at several points simultaneously, and although the terrain is difficult, it would not seriously impede ~~Chinese military movements,~~ the movement of lightly equipped Chinese Communist forces, particularly if undertaken during the October-to-May dry season.

16. Reference Page 10, Par, 20. Revise to read:

20. In spite of the relative ease with which Burma could be invaded, we do not believe that an open invasion will be attempted, ~~at least~~ during the next twelve months. The Chinese Communist and Soviet leaders probably regard the present internal situation in Burma as favorable to an eventual Communist victory without resort to open invasion, with its attendant risks. ~~Furthermore, they must calculate, in view of the successful UN intervention in Korea, that UN forces might well be dispatched to Burma if Chinese Communist forces openly invaded Burma in force with the obvious intention of seizing the country. A further deterring factor to open aggression must be a fear that such a step would aggravate the very risks and dangers (US and Western rearmament, Western unity and determination, and the possibility of general war) that Soviet propaganda and diplomacy now appear to be trying to mitigate or avoid.~~

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17. Reference Page 12, Par. 23, Last sentence in Paragraph. Revise the last sentence of this paragraph to read:

If aid were not forthcoming, the Burmese Government would probably continue the struggle until faced with a hopeless situation, such as the loss of its armed forces.

18. Reference Page 12, Par. 24, Last sentence of Paragraph (on Page 13).

Revise to read:

Proffered aid might be accepted in considerable quantities sometime before the Burmese Government's position became desperate, provided the conditions and nature of the aid were not such as either to offend Burmese national sensibilities or to afford an open provocation to the Chinese Communists.

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